Moskva Maintenance Report - In a recent article titled "Is the Moskva Class Helicopter Cruiser the Best Navy Design for the Drone Era?" writer Przemysław Ziemacki suggested that the Moskva class cruisers would be a useful model for surface combat in the future. He wrote, "The cruiser-inspired design of the ship will have ample space for stand-off weapons and an air wing consisting of vertical lift drones and helicopters."1 The ship will have a large battery of universal Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). ) to carry long-range anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles. Anti-ship missiles will replace fixed-wing aircraft for attack and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), while surface-to-air missiles will provide air defense. Early warning will be provided by radar-equipped helicopters or tilt-rotor aircraft, while vertical take-off UAVs will provide target acquisition for long-range missiles. Self-contained platforms such as "ships inspired by the Moskva-class helicopter carriers and reinforced with stealth lines appear to be a ready-made solution for distributed lethal strike tactics." The article concluded that including this type of ship in the US Navy would make "the entire fleet architecture less vulnerable and more diverse."
The foundation of our article rests on three principles: aircraft operators are, or will soon be, too vulnerable for certain roles; manned naval aviation will be replaced by ship stand-off guns; and drones have fundamentally changed warfare. From these principles, the article proposes that a more independent aviation cruiser would be less vulnerable in an enemy's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone and could influence "sea denial" in the wide seas, being agile and agile. lethal means of survival are distributed instead of “precious sitting ducks.”2 Both the underlying principle and the proposed results are flawed.
Moskva Maintenance Report
The article names itself by the class name Moskva. It was the largest helicopter cruiser, but like all helicopter cruisers, it failed. They were single-purpose ships with inflexible guns, too small air groups, small flight decks, and terrible sea patrols that exacerbated other problems. The planned role of hunting American ballistic missile submarines before they were launched was removed before the Moskva was commissioned: There were too many American submarines lurking in too vast an ocean to successfully hunt them.
Russian Salvage Ship Kommuna
The written proposal 'Modern Moskva' avoided the technical failures of the design but did not address the fundamental flaws that destroyed all helicopter cruisers. Surface combatants such as cruisers, destroyers and frigates require deck space for missiles, radars and weapons. Airships require deck space for aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft are more efficient than rotary-wing aircraft, and conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) - especially with catapults and arresters - are more efficient than vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL). Trying to build a single crew of both aviation and surface battleships resulted in ships that were larger and more expensive than surface battleships, but worse at aircraft operations than aircraft carriers.
As a result, helicopter cruisers are a rare and short-lived type of surface combatant worldwide. Only six awkward hybrids were ever commissioned: France built one, Italy three, Soviet Union two. Japan built four small helicopter destroyers (DDHs). 3 In each case, these helicopter ship designs were specific carriers: the Soviet Kiev class, the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi* class, and the Japanese Hyuga class. France's Marine Nationale chose not to replace Jeanne d'Arc after retiring in 2010.
Moskva Class, Mikhail Kukhtarev, 07/28/1970 (pennant number 846 indicates that this is Moskva in 1974, photo may be incorrectly dated)
The Moskva class is a striking symbol of Soviet Naval Power. These ships embody the mid-Cold War warship aesthetic with a full arsenal of twin-arm launchers, multi-barreled anti-submarine rockets, and a jungle of antennas sprouting from every surface except the massive flight deck. It is also poorly understood in the West. The Soviets were never satisfied with the design, canceling production after the first two ships supported separate dedicated aircraft carriers and anti-submarine submarines, the 6th Kiev and Tblisi class and the 17th ASW class cruisers Kara and Kresta-II in particular. . .4
This Is How The Ukrainian Neptune Missiles Sank The Mighty Russian Moskva Ship
The Moskva class, known to the Soviets as Проект 1123 "Кондор" Противолодочная Крейсера [Пр.1123 ПКР], (Project 1123 "Condor" Anti-Submarine123Pr.0 late 1123 PKR/Pr.0 were two cruisers, Moskva and Leningrad, built between 1962 and 1965, entering service in late 1967 and mid 1969 respectively. The Moskva class is considered an anti-submarine cruiser, designed to hunt down enemy SSBNs and SSNs as part of an anti-submarine attack-submarine group within the long range of the Soviet Union.5 The group's main mission was to sink American ballistic missile submarines.That was 41 for the Merdika, before they could be launched.6
USS George Washington (SSBN-598), flagship 41 For Freedom (Photo via Naval History and Heritage Command)
Requirements were set at 14 helicopters to enable 24/7 ASW helicopter coverage, and a large number of surface-to-air missiles for self-defense. Ships produced by guns (from bow to stern):7
The main organic weapon of the Moskva Leningrad class battleships. Click to expand. (Image from airbase.ru, modified by the author.)
Explanation Of What Happened To The Cruiser \
This concept and armament made sense in 1958, when submarine-launched ballistic missiles had short ranges and SSBNs had to get close to Soviet shores. 8 In 1964 the USN introduced the new Polaris A-3 missile, which expanded its range to nearly 3,000 missiles. miles.9 With the commissioning of the Moskva in December 1967, all 41 ships to Freedom were commissioned, with 23 of their ships carrying the Polaris A-3.10 The increased range of the Polaris A-3 meant that US SSBNs could hit targets deep inside. USSR as Volgograd from the western patrol area of the British Isles, well beyond the reach of Soviet ASW forces. 11 Project 1123 was lost in the mission it was designed to pre-launch, having never been able to find and destroy so many scattered submarines. over a wide area as before the SSBN can launch their long range missiles.
The defining feature of the Moskva class is the compliment of 14 helicopters housed in two hangars, one at deck level for the 25th two helicopters (NATO code name: HORMON) and a larger one below the flight deck for the other 12 Kamovs. The biggest limitation of these hangar and flight deck arrangements is their relative inefficiency compared to traditional full deck carriers. There is only space on the flight deck to launch or recover four aircraft at a time. This was sufficient for the design requirements, which were based on maintaining a smaller number of aircraft. However, the limited space prevented the efficient air group surge, and the freeboard forced center lift was low, instead of a more efficient deckside design. The Soviet Navy found the Moskva class's aviation facilities to be limited and inadequate for their role. 12 The third ship in the class was to be built to a different specification, Project 1123.3, 2000 tons heavier, 12m longer and focused on ship upgrades. air defense and aviation facilities. 13 Project 1123.3 was canceled before commissioning and focus shifted to the more promising Project 1143, the four Kiev-class carriers.
Among the main reasons for canceling further development of the Moscow class was the terrible seakeeping design. The bow performed very well in rough seas, sending large amounts of water through the bow. 14 In sea trials in 1970, the Moskva encountered a storm of sea level 6, meaning a calm wave height of 4-6m (13-20 ft). -ka-top. During the storm, the navigation bridge 23m (75 ft) above the waterline was continuously flooded
The Moskva class also has a wide, shallow and rounded stern. This causes problems with reel stability in all but temperate seas. This meant that flight operations could only be conducted up to swell-setting 5, or 2.5–4 m (8–13 ft), especially when combined with excessive swell. 16 In addition, the class transported a great deal of water. on the bow that the gun range was inoperable in heavy seas and vulnerable to damage under sea conditions 6.17 The Moskva Class failed to meet the sea maintenance requirements set by the Soviet Navy.18 It could not fight effectively in bad weather, a fatal mistake. for ships designed to hunt down enemy submarines in the North Atlantic.
Camera Moskva 5 Camera Moskwa 5 Lens Industar 24 35 /
Project 1123 stands among the worst class of ships to go to sea during the Cold War. The Moskva class had too few aircraft, too small a flight deck, poorly laid out guns, very poor sea maintenance, and was generally unsuitable for operations in rough seas or frequent storms, even though it was designed for the North Atlantic. They were not significantly modernized during their service and were quickly phased out after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many know that the Moskva class cruisers are terrible ships to use. The Soviets not only abandoned further construction of the class, but also further development of the design before the second ship of the class, Leningrad, was commissioned. 19 Replacing Project 1123 The Soviets built Project 1143, the Kiev class, another one. a reasonable, seaworthy and efficient vessel with a full flight deck which saw serial production and extensive development.20
Exploring the development and history of the Moskva-class helicopter cruisers, let's examine the 'Modern Moskva' proposal.
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